Archive Page 2

14
Feb

Book Review – “The Four Pillars Of Investing”

It’s been a while since I was blown away by a financial book, but William Bernstein’s The Four Pillars of Investing: Lessons For Building A Winning Portfolio did just that.

Guess what? I’ll throw you a bone and not make you read its 297 pages. Here’s Bernstein’s “Four Pillars”. Try not to treat them lightly.

Pillar One. The Theory of Investing – “Risk and reward go hand-in-hand.”

Investors worldwide should be beaten over the head with the phrase “risk and reward go hand in hand.” Think of the trouble we would’ve saved if everyone had believed that axiom. Charles Ponzi and Bernie Madoff wouldn’t be famous. Asset bubbles everywhere, from the South Sea speculation to the Dutch Tulip Madness to the mortgage crisis of 2008 would’ve been averted completely when their participants realized there was no such thing as a free lunch. And if a stock market genius really did find a mechanism to “get rich quick”, under what circumstances would he share it with a complete stranger for $999.95?


^ Even this guy won’t get you rich quick, and if you can’t trust a guy in a giant green money suit, who can you trust?

Pillar Two. The History of Investing – “It is a fact that, from time to time, the markets and investing public go barking mad.”

One need only to look back a few short years to see the last time an economic market went barking mad. There have been many such instancesIt’s been posited that they occur about once per generation, enough time for new blood to enter the system, and there will be many more. The author offers a short history of famous topsOn betting against a rising bubble, Keynes once said, “Markets can remain irrational a lot longer than you and I can remain solvent”. and bottoms upon his belief that there’s perhaps no more appropriate discipline than investing for George Santayana’s famous quote, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

Pillar Three. The Psychology of Investing – “The major premise of economics is that investors are rational and will always behave in their own self-interest. There’s only one problem. It isn’t true.”

In Pillar Three, Bernstein breaks down psychological fallacies which prevent investors from making rational choices. From the average investor’s belief that he will beat the market by about 2% per year,Otherwise known as “Illusory superiority”, or “The Lake Wobegon effect”, in reference to a fictional town where “all the women are strong, all the men are good looking, and all the children are above average.” to the recency illusion in which the immediate past is thought to be predictive of the long-term future, investors are susceptible to a wide array of behavioral wealth-corroding effects.


^ He’s like a modern-day Buddha

Pillar Four. The Business of Investing – “Investors tend to be touchingly naive about stockbrokers and mutual fund companies: brokers are not your friends…You are in fact locked in a financial life-and-death struggle with the investment industry.”

A classic story about Wall Street involves an out-of-towner on a tour of Manhattan with his urbane friend. The two arrive at the harbor, where the city dweller points to a line of elegant vessels.

“There are the bankers’ yachts,” he says grandly. “And there are the brokers’ yachts.” The visitor looks at the magnificent fleet and asks, “Where are the customers’ yachts?”

The joke, of course, underscores the fact that the vast amounts of money swishing through Wall Street rarely find themselves a permanent home in the bank accounts of the little guy. Your financial advisor, your insurance agent, your stock broker – they may be nice guys, but they have their own priorities which rarely dovetail with yours, and it pays never to forget that fact.

Bernstein’s writing is accessible to non-MBAs, while still steeped in logic and rigor. I’ve re-read this book every few years, and I will continue to do so. You should do the same.

Grade: A

14
Feb

When the average isn’t the average

“The stock market returns an average of 10% per year.” How often have you heard that saying? Do you really understand what it means? Just why is Queen Latifah famous, anyway? Sorry…I got distracted.

Please carefully review the following numeric series: -20%, +20%, -20%, +20%, -20%, +20%. If those were your yearly investment results for the past six years, what was your average yearly rate of return? If you said “-2.02% per year”, you are correct. If you said “0% per year”, you have mistaken arithmetic return for geometric return. If you said “yellow”, you may have attended a public school in South Carolina, and for that I am truly sorry.

Let’s back up and assume that you invested $100,000 and earned those aforementioned returns. After one year, you would have $80,000$100,000 minus 20%. After two years, you would be worth $96,000The first year’s $80,000 plus 20%. Notice a pattern here? Even though your first two returns (-20% and +20%) averaged out to zero, you still lost money overall. Follow that trend for six years and you’d be left with just shy of $88,474, or barely enough to buy Apple’s newest iFad.

A frequent investing mistake when calculating yearly returns is to add the returns for each year, and divide by the number of years. While this is the common definition of “average”, this actually denotes an arithmetic average, which provides incorrect results when reviewing financial data.

In fact, the correct method is to convert to a decimal and multiply by your starting capital. In the case above, $100,000 x 1.2 x 0.8 x 1.2 x 0.8 x 1.2 x 0.8 = $88,473.60. And ($88,473 / $100,000) raised to .1666661 / number of years, which is six equals 0.979796, or a loss of about 2.02% per year. Let’s try it again with a zero “average” return but larger deviations: $100,000 x 1.4 x 0.6 x 1.4 x 0.6 x 1.4 x 0.6 = $59,270.40, or -8.35% per year. Oh no!


^ Not relevant to this topic, but a good Brad Pitt “Oh No” pic

The overriding lesson here is that the geometric return is always less than or equal to the arithmetic return, and will be drastically lower in times of high volatility. Consider if your financial adviser handed you the following results for four years of investing: +100%, +100%, +100%, -100%. Arithmetic average: 50% per year. Geometric (real) average: 0%. You lost all your money. Go back to the starting line. Do not pass Go. Do not collect $200. Do not adopt a Cambodian baby with Angelina Jolie.

To follow up with my starting paragraph, historically the United States stock market has returned approximately 10%equity appreciation plus dividends each year. This is a compound (geometric) return, which is tantamount to multiplying your money by 1.1 per annum. By now you should realize that this means the arithmetic average was well over 10% per year, and this also means the next time you hear your pretentious neighbor brag about last year’s 60% return on his volatile hedge fund after a rough starting stretch, you can rest easy knowing that the law of geometric averages is a high barrier to hurdle.

I’m just kidding, you should let your dog out to go pee in his yard.

13
Feb

Book Review – “The End of Wall Street”

The End of Wall Street, sensationalist title notwithstanding, is a devastatingly blunt account of the foibles and hubris that led to the US housing boom and bust of 2006-2008.

Roger Lowenstein creates a gripping narrative that explains not only the “what” but the “why” of the mechanisms behind worst American recession since the Great Depression. His account begins with a description of the runaway unregulated mortgage economy, where financial firms battled for a share of the exploding sub-prime loan market, which their (flawed) models predicted offered huge profits with limited downside. The semi-private entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac led the way, offering over $5 trillion in loans as the result of new government initiatives to provide affordable housing to everyone, regardless of income.

Low prevailing worldwide interest rates put the grail of home ownership within reach of previously unqualified borrowers, and also left investors looking for a way to squeeze a few extra basis points of return on their capital. A huge influx of foreign money meant that banks no longer held their mortgages but instead packaged and sold them to the highest bidder, shifting their acquisition emphasis from loan quality to loan quantity.

In the rush to acquire new loans, no matter how dubious, lending procedures were dropped and so-called Alternative A mortgagesA type of loan where prospective borrowers were not required to supply documentation of their income, and their more dangerous subset NINANo Income, No Asset: the borrowers did not supply documentation of income or assets mortgages were used and abused in a classic example of the greater fool theory which assumed an unending rise in home prices.

Lowenstein adeptly deciphers the complicated process by which these deadly loans were chopped into tranches using CDOsDummy corporations which invested in first-order securities which had themselves acquired mortgages and given high-quality ratings by so-called independent ratings agencies with questionable standards. He doesn’t skip the complicit Federal Reserve, whose reliance on a free-market economy would be at first sorely tested, and then shattered, with the infamous TARP bailout, and also gives a blow-by-blow account of the failings and near-failings of such venerable firms as Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, Citi, AIG, and Morgan Stanley.

You surely remember the basics of those dark days, but reading The End of Wall Street is an an eye-opening experience which will leave you shaking your head, wondering how so many smart people could be so dumb. The fault for the crash was spread among many, and this book’s most appealing quality is how it weaves all of their stories together to chronicle the runaway train which spectacularly derailed in the late summer of 2008.

If you’re not a finance geek, the prose can get a bit dry at times. There’s no James Bond or Jason Bourne momentsNew movie idea: James Bond fights Jason Bourne. Possibly with lasers., but if reading about the conversations and negotiations of the most powerful men in finance during the mortgage crisis sounds appealing to you, you’ll enjoy this one.

Grade: B+

31
Jan

Marginal utility of money

Quick: I’ve handed you a quarter to flip. Heads, I’ll give you $50 million; tails, you get nothing. Oh, there’s another option – skip the flip and I’ll give you $20 million right now. Which will it be?

The conundrum here is that most people would pick the guaranteed $20 million over the $25 million expected valueExpected value, in economic terms, is the sum of the valuation of all possible outcomes of a situation multiplied by the probability that they will happen. In this case, there’s a 50% chance you get $50 million and a 50% chance you will get nothing. Hence, (0.5 x $50,000,000) + (0.5 x $0) = $25,000,000 expected value. you’d get from the coin flip. Some economics texts would call that irrational behavior. I couldn’t disagree more.

Let’s attack this using a different mental exercise. You’ve just won a few million from Carlos Mencia in a class action suit for pain and distress caused by extraordinarily awful comedic material. Being of sound financial judgement, you’ve decided to buy an Audi R8.

After plunking down $140,000 for this chunk of Viagra on wheels, the dealer offers you a second model (in green) for the same price. Do you take it?

Well, probably not.

Do you remember anything from Econ 101? There’s a term called “marginal utility“, which can be described as the utility gained from an additional unit of a good or service. If you’ve ever stuffed yourself with five pieces of pizza and declined a free sixth, you’ll know that the marginal utility of that sixth piece of pizza was zero.(or negative: you’d pay not to eat it)

Back to the car. The first car was worth more to you than $140,000 in cash, which is why you exchanged the latter for the former. The salient point here is the second car has less “marginal value” to you and, from your viewpoint, is actually worth less than the first car, although it’s exactly the same car.

You’re smart. If not, you’d be listening to Nickelback and stalking your exes on Facebook instead of reading a financial blog. The fact that a second Audi is less valuable to you than the first is no earth-shaking revelation. However, sometimes we forget to apply this concept to money itself. There’s a saying which goes, “the first million is the hardest”. That can, without altering the meaning of the phrase, be restated as “the first million is the most valuable.”

Study after financial study has shown that after essentials such as food, water, and shelter are taken care of, happiness increases very little with additional amounts of income or net worth. The first dollar is more valuable than the second.For the mathematically-inclined among you, this is tied to a phenomenon known as Benford’s Law, which gives the surprising result that among most real-world financial data, the first digit is a “1″ about 30% of the time, declining to the point where “9″ as a first digit occurs less than 5% of the time. Benford’s Law is used by auditors to sniff out cooked books, and is admissible in court as evidence of fraudulent data. All Benjamins are not created equal.

There are a few exceptions to the law of diminishing utility of money, namely, when the individual is trying to reach a certain monetary benchmark. In the beginning of the 1994 film Maverick, Bret Maverick, played by a pre-crazy Mel Gibson, is $3,000 short of a poker tournament entry fee of $25,000. While his efforts to make the needed $3,000 are entertaining, they also underscore the point that the final $3,000 is highly valued by Maverick. If you waited until right before the tournament started and asked him to choose between a guaranteed $2,000 or a coin flip for $3,000, he would pick the chance to win $3,000 ($1,500 expected value) over the risk-free $2,000.Note that this is the opposite result of the coin-flip choice from our first paragraph. Interesting.

Also, we get to see Jodie Foster:

In most cases, example above notwithstanding, the diminishing marginal utility of money is a reliable phenomenon.

I’m not telling you not to shoot for the stars. I’m not telling you to disregard your dream where Microsoft buys your social-networking-for-dogs website for 73 bajillion dollars and you live out your days in Tahiti wearing small shorts and drinking big drinks. Just keep in mind: the first million, well, that will be the sweetest.